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Dr. Walid Phares
Australia: Down Under Jihad?
August 7, 2009
Every time a liberal democracy was targeted by jihadi terror; from 9/11,
Madrid's trains, London's subways, Holland's Van Gogh assassination, to
all other terror-related arrests in France, Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Italy, and Denmark, a similar question was repeated senselessly: "Why do
they hate us?"
Unfortunately in all of these Western societies, the political debate
about the root causes and future of jihadi violence failed to answer
this seminal question. Furthermore, a stunningly compromised expertise
failed its governments by dragging authorities into chronic
misinterpretation of what is happening and what to do about it. One more
time, the experiment is repeating itself in Australia. Here is why:
As in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other Western
democracies, law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies have been
efficient in monitoring the threat, swift in responding and lucky in
uprooting networks planning terror. With the exceptions of the first
strikes of 2001 in New York, 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London, police
and security teams have been able to stop the plots before they are
executed; knock on wood so far. But these law enforcement heroes are
operating under the aegis of questionable government strategies, or
rather non-strategies, with dramatic consequences. The latest arrests
made in Melbourne, Australia, are another example.
Thanks to a massive counterterrorism operation with multiple raids
throughout the state of Victoria, four Australian citizens of Somali and
Lebanese heritage were arrested at dawn. Police and agencies executed 19
search warrants, which resulted in the stopping of a plot to launch a
suicide attack in Melbourne, a la Mumbai, on an army base. Nayef el
Sayyed, Saney Edow Aweys, Wissam Mahmoud Fattal, Yacqub Khayre, and
Abdirahman Ahmed, aged between 22 and 26, were arrested and charged with
preparing a terrorist attack on the Holsworthy army base in southwest
Sydney. Other suspects were under arrest already, one accordingly was
cooperating. More arrests could be made.
Authorities said the operation "disrupted a terrorist attack that could
have claimed many lives." Australian officials were concerned that a
Somali jihadist had obtained a "fatwa" (religious edict) from Somalia
calling for attacks in the country within weeks. It is believed that at
least two of the conspirators have links to Somali Shabab al-Jihad, a
group with ties to al-Qaida. Australia was lucky to have aborted the
strike. But more ominous is the bigger picture.
Australia, regardless of Somali and Lebanese connections in this
particular operation, is on the al-Qaida international list of Kuffar
(infidel) countries to be hit; and Canberra must realize that is part of
the jihadi campaign against democracies; even though its current
government is dismantling the so-called "war on terror," linguistically.
Jihadi ideology and strategies cannot be changed or affected by the
wishful thinking of their victims. That is what Washington, London, and
the rest of the partners in the so-called "overseas contingency
operations” are learning day after day from Waziristan to North
Carolina. Australia's new school of thinking on the confrontation,
emulating U.S. and U.K. "new" doctrines, argues that by not pinpointing
the ideology of the threat, it will just go away, or at least it would
be sidelined.
Almost a month before the August arrests, Attorney General Robert
McClelland launched "project lexicon," a study on the "language
surrounding terrorism." As argued by British and American experts
before, the Australian report found that "several of the words or
phrases used to describe terrorism had the inadvertent effect of
glorifying violent criminal behavior." It added that "rather than
framing terrorism as a struggle by describing it as a "war" or "jihad",
acts of terror should be described as serious criminal acts usually
directed at innocent civilians."
Obviously, the Australian report, as with its Western cousins, fell into
the trap of the jihadi war of ideas aiming at confusing and mitigating
democracies by taking out their main weapon against the jihadists: to
expose their ideology and rally the counter jihadist Muslims.
The evidence to such failure in identifying the threat came few weeks
later as agencies were arresting people in their early 20s. As we saw in
Georgia in the U.S., and in Birmingham in the U.K., a lexicon banning
clear words only contributes to the defeat of democracies. For such
wrong analysis is responsible for legitimizing jihadism in the eyes of
indoctrinated youth. Naturally, if jihadism is not exposed, jihadi
ideologues and cadrescan operate freely and in full legitimacy to
further recruit.
Worse, by banning the use of extremely important terms, these
medieval-like lexicons terminate the ability of analysts, let alone the
public, to detect the "threat." The West in general, and Australia in
particular, will unfortunately continue to experience the catastrophic
effects of blurring their own vision, as most seasoned experts in
jihadism believe the plots we have already uncovered are only the
beginning.
Why did Australia’s government insist on inflicting its country to
further risks of radicalization? Not only did it create a lexicon to
confuse its law enforcement and public, but just one day before the
arrests of the Salafi jihadists, the Australian Communications and Media
Authority handed the jihadi Khomeinists a propaganda victory. Hezbollah
TV, banned in the U.S. and in some European countries, was granted a
license to broadcast. Al Manar, funded by the Iranian regime, promotes
suicide bombings. Its capacity to produce jihadist minds is by far
superior to the radical sheiks of Somalia and their fatwas.
The question is not why the jihadists are thrusting through the last
safe Western society, but it is why Australia's policy makers are being
duped by their experts. |
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